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Blowing the Whistle in the Digital Age:
Are You Really Anonymous? The Perils and Pitfalls
of Anonymity in Whistleblowing Law
Dr. Tanya M. Marcum, J.D. & Jacob Young, D.B.A.
“He perceives very clearly that the world is in greater peril from
those who tolerate or encourage evil than from those who actually
commit it.” Albert Einstein’s tribute to Pablo Casals1
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an employee works for a private company in a state with
“at-will” employment.  The employee discovers wrongdoing within
the employee’s organization.  This employee wants to inform the or-
ganization of the wrongdoing but is afraid of doing so because they
have heard horror stories about the effects of retaliation.  In trying to
report the wrongdoing, the employee types out the information on the
employee’s computer, uses the company network to print it on the
printer at work and mails it to the organization.  Unbeknownst to the
employee, the organization was able to determine that the letter came
from a company printer by examining invisible watermarks on the
document.  After reviewing system logs, the employee is identified as
the author of the document.  The employee is later terminated with-
out any mention of the letter, leaving no clear evidence that it was in
response to reporting the wrongdoing.  The employee could have
taken different steps to remain anonymous to avoid retaliation if he or
she had been aware of methods of identification.
Laws and ethical standards created by both government and
nongovernment organizations attempt to protect shareholders, man-
agers, employees, clients, customers, the public and government from
corporate corruption, fraud, and other misdeeds.2  Ideally, corporate
governance should provide for transparency, full disclosure, and accu-
rate financial data.3  Managerial review, internal auditing and actual
1. J. MA. CORREDOR, CONVERSATIONS WITH CASALS 11 (André Mangeot trans., E.P. Dutton
& Co. Inc., 1957).
2. Guhan Subramanian, Corporate Governance 2.0, 92 HAR. BUS. REV. 96 (2015) (explaining
that these legal and ethical standards are commonly referred to as corporate governance).
3. Umang Desai, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 432 (2012).
1
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discovery are some mechanisms to discover wrongdoing within an or-
ganization.  However, the single most important method to discover
internal wrongdoing is with employee tips or whistleblowing.4  Whis-
tleblowing is defined as “the disclosure by organization members (for-
mer or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the
control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be
able to effect action.”5  The results of one survey suggested that whis-
tleblowers exposed 43% of the fraud in private corporations, while
auditors uncovered a mere 19%.6  Stephen M. Kohn, the President of
the National Whistleblower Center, stated that “[t]his survey is proof
that corporate shareholders directly benefit from whistleblower dis-
closures.  Instead of firing the whistleblower, this survey demonstrates
that corporate culture should change.”7
Many companies create and operate internal whistleblower pro-
grams, which commonly include whistleblower hotlines, to create an
environment that encourages the exchange of information regarding
perceived wrongdoings within the organization.8  Publicly held corpo-
rations in the U.S.  must establish internal procedures to receive com-
plaints about accounting irregularities and create procedures that will
allow for anonymous and confidential submission by employees of
such accounting concerns.9 If protected internal whistleblower report-
ing is an available option, whistleblowers will report internally over
external reporting avenues.10  However, there is a major difference
between confidential submissions by a whistleblower as compared to
anonymous submissions by a whistleblower.  Some laws attempt to
create protection for whistleblowers.  The key word here is attempt.
Under the best of circumstances, those who report wrongdoings at
their place of employment often run a high risk of retaliation once
they report the wrongdoing.  Some of these whistleblowers believe
that they are anonymously reporting the wrongdoing.  However, al-
4. Leonardo Labriola, Paying Too Dearly for a Whistle: Properly Protecting Internal Whistle-
blowers, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2839, 2846 (2017).
5. Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing,
4(1), J. OF BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985).
6. Whistleblowers Still the Best at Detecting Fraud, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR, https://www
.whistleblowers.org/news/whistleblowers-still-the-best-at-detecting-fraud/ (last visited May 19,
2018).
7. Id.
8. Richard Moberly, Confidentiality and Whistleblowing, 96 N.C. L. REV. 751, 759 (2018).
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C (2012)).
10. Christine A. Ladwig, A Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Triple Win Scenario: The Joint
Benefit of an Internal-External Reporting Alliance for Corporations, Whistleblowers and Govern-
ment, 27(1) MIDWEST L. J. 79, 87 (2017).
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though stated as an anonymous system for reporting fraud and abuse,
many are not actually anonymous.  If anonymous reporting is only
confidential, then there are increased disincentives for the whistle-
blowers to report the violations of the law by their employer.
Most potential whistleblowers are worried about both their per-
sonal and professional lives and the changes that will likely take place,
most of which will not be positive should they decide to blow the whis-
tle.  For many, the difficult personal and professional decision to come
forward and report wrongdoing requires a reconciliation of conflicting
values.  On the one hand, our society celebrates team players and, on
the other, it has contempt for mindless sheep that go along to get
along.  At times, our society champions the individual who does what
is right.  Too often, however, society unfairly characterizes an individ-
ual who reports problems as disloyal.11
A whistleblower is perceived as the “eyes and ears” of the public at
large who need protection in the areas of health, safety, finances and
overall public welfare.12  Based on this definition, why are there not
more whistleblowers?  Unfortunately, there are several factors that
might discourage those who have knowledge of wrongdoing from
blowing the whistle.  First, organizational insiders might be hesitant to
report out of fear of retaliation13 or to simply avoid being the bearer
of bad news.14  Retaliation against those who speak up is quite com-
11. Connor C. Turpan, Whistleblower? More Like Cybercriminal: The Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act as Applied to Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers, 42 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
120, 121 (2016).
12. See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZA-
TIONAL & LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES (1992).
13. See Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to
Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25(4) ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 706 (2000); MAR-
CIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL & LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES (1992); Michael J. Withey & William H.
Cooper, Predicting Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect, 34(4) ADMIN. SCI. Q. 521 (1989); Susan J.
Ashford et al., Out on a Limb: The Role of Context and Impression Management in Selling Gen-
der-equity Issues, 43(1) ADMIN. SCI. Q. 23 (1998).
14. See Jayson L. Dibble & Timothy R. Levine, Breaking Good and Bad News: Direction of
the MUM Effect and Senders’ Cognitive Representations of News Valence, 37(5) COMM. RES. 703
(2010); Jayson L. Dibble & Timothy R. Levine, Sharing Good and Bad News with Friends and
Strangers: Reasons for and Communication Behaviors Associated with the MUM Effect, 64(4)
COMM. STUD. 431 (2013); Sidney Rosen & Abraham Tesser, On Reluctance to Communicate
Undesirable Information: The MUM Effect, 33(3) SOCIOMETRY 253 (1970); ChongWoo Park et
al., Overcoming the Mum Effect in IT Project Reporting: Impacts of Fault Responsibility and
Time Urgency, 9(7) J. ASSN. FOR INFO. SYS. 409 (2008); Laura E. Marler et al., Don’t Make Me
the Bad Guy: Organizational Norms, Self-monitoring, and the Mum Effect, 24(1) J. OF MANAGE-
RIAL ISSUES 97 (2012).
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mon15 and is “most likely and most severe when the observed wrong-
doing is most systemic and most central to the operation of the
agency.”16 Retaliation can be levied in many forms, such as nullifica-
tion, isolation, defamation, expulsion, ostracism, demotion or termina-
tion.17 One study reports that approximately two thirds of the
whistleblowers in their study had experienced the following forms of
retaliation: 69% lost their job or were forced to retire; 64% received
negative employment performance evaluations; 68% had work more
closely monitored by supervisors; 69% were criticized or avoided by
coworkers; and 64% were blacklisted from getting another job in their
field.18
Second, although anonymity is desired to protect whistleblowers
from retaliation,19 existing channels for soliciting reports of wrongdo-
ing fail to provide adequate anonymity protection for naı̈ve users of
modern technology.  The U.S. has passed several whistleblower pro-
tection laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200220 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,21
which provide increased regulation and oversight to address corporate
misconduct.  Both pieces of legislation contain whistleblowing provi-
sions that require publicly-traded companies to establish “anony-
mous” reporting channels and strengthen the penalties for retaliation
against those who report misconduct.22 As a result, several technology
15. Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management Re-
taliation: The Battle to Control Information about Organization Corruption, 26(1) WORK & OC-
CUPATIONS 107 (1999).
16. Id. at 125.
17. Muel Kaptein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the Ethical Cul-
ture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing, 98(3) J. OF BUS. ETHICS
513, 514 (2010); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Melissa S. Baucus, Internal vs. External Whistle-
blowers: A Comparison of Whistleblowering Processes, 17(12) J. BUS. ETHICS 1281, 1285 (1998);
Tim Barnett et al., The Internal Disclosure Policies of Private-sector Employers: An Initial Look
at Their Relationship to Employee Whistleblowing, 12(2) J. BUS. ETHICS 127, 127-28 (1993).
18. Rothschild, supra note 15, at 120.
19. Susan Ayers & Steven E. Kaplan, Wrongdoing by Consultants: An Examination of Em-
ployees? Reporting Intentions, 57(2) J. BUS. ETHICS 121, 127 (2005); Steven E. Kaplan & Joseph
J. Schultz, The Role of Internal Audit in Sensitive Communications, J. MGMT. STUD. 10 (2006);
Steven E. Kaplan & Joseph J. Schultz, Intentions to Report Questionable Acts: An Examination
of the Influence of Anonymous Reporting Channel, Internal Audit Quality, and Setting, 71(2) J.
BUS. ETHICS 109, 112 (2007); Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Effective-Whistle Blowing, 20(3)
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 679, 692 (1995); Frederick A. Elliston, Anonymity and Whistleblowing,
1(3) J. BUS. ETHICS 167-177 (1982).
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C (2012)).
21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)).
22. STEPHEN M. KOHN, THE NEW WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE
TO DOING WHAT’S RIGHT AND PROTECTING YOURSELF, 2 (3d ed. 2017).
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firms began developing and marketing internal reporting systems to
meet this new demand.  However, most of the commercial reporting
systems available today still fail to provide adequate anonymity pro-
tections for whistleblowers.  If the use of a system could potentially
compromise the identity of the user, it cannot be considered to pro-
vide anonymity.  These design flaws can be traced back to lawmakers’
failure to define anonymity and outline the required system character-
istics necessary to achieve anonymity.  This has led many whistleblow-
ers to develop a false sense of security by believing that these systems
will truly protect their anonymity.  Therefore, the failure to ensure
that anonymity is truly achieved has compromised the identity of nu-
merous whistleblowers and resulted in the very retaliation that
lawmakers intended to prevent.
Third, despite the passage of legislation aimed at protecting whistle-
blowers, existing United States laws are still limited to certain types of
employees and industries.23  Further, those who seek protection under
the law are required to maintain strict compliance with the established
protocol to qualify for protection,24 which can ultimately leave em-
ployees vulnerable to retaliation.25  What should an employee do
when they have detected fraud or some other type of wrongdoing
within their place of employment?  Most potential whistleblowers
worry about retaliation and the release of their identity to their em-
ployer.  Does a reporting system truly provide anonymity as some
laws require?  Will a naı̈ve reporter recognize when a system may not
actually be anonymous as promised?  To address these issues, this arti-
cle examines whistleblowing laws with respect to anonymity, confiden-
tiality and technological requirements.  In part II of this article, we
discuss federal laws protecting whistleblowers and the requirements of
anonymity.  In part III, we discuss the difference between anonymity
versus confidentiality, motivations for and methods available to iden-
tify whistleblowers.  In order to better protect whistleblowers, part IV
contains the discussion of potential legislative solutions to the legal
shortcomings of current federal laws.
23. Id. See also TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S
SURVIVAL GUIDE 149 (2011).
24. Id. See also MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANI-
ZATIONAL & LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 188 (1992); Janet P. Near,
Terry M. Dworkin & Marcia P. Miceli, Explaining the Whistleblowing Process: Suggestions from
Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4(3) J. ORGANIZ. SCI. 393 (1993).
25. TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL
GUIDE 149 (2011); see also KOHN, supra note 22.
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II. THE FEDERAL LAWS THAT SEEM TO
PROTECT WHISTLEBLOWERS
“Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good
men should look on and do nothing.” John Stuart Mill,
philosopher26
The checks and balances in the United States Government were es-
tablished in such a way as to encourage individuals to report what he
or she might perceive as a legal wrong.  This is true about fraud and
abuse within both the government and corporate America.  The pre-
mise is that those working within the organizations will come forward
to report the perceived abuse because these individuals are the in the
best position to report misconduct within their organizations.27
A potential whistleblower is faced with a major legal and ethical
dilemma from the onset, whether to go public with the information,
provide the information confidentially or to proceed with disclosure
using a channel that allows anonymous reporting.  With the frag-
mented federal whistleblower laws, finding the applicable law that
may protect the whistleblower is a daunting task.  Whistleblowers can
be placed in three different categories: (1) the corporate employee
whistleblower; (2) a public whistleblower; and/or (3) the government
employee whistleblower.28 The federal laws discussed in this article
will focus on all three types of whistleblowers.
A. Laws with the Primary Focus on Whistleblower Protection
It is important to understand some of the sources of whistleblower
laws in the United States.  The U.S federal and state laws surrounding
the concept of whistleblowing are fragmented.  There are many laws
that appear to govern this area rather than one comprehensive whis-
tleblower protection law.  Some laws focus on whistleblowers, other
focus on another area with whistleblowing as a secondary focus.  Most
of the whistleblower laws do not mandate that an employee first re-
port the wrongdoing to the employer using an internal compliance
system before they report to the applicable federal or government au-
thority.29  One source suggests that there are over 55 different laws
26. NICHOLAS CAPALDI, JOHN STUART MILL: A BIOGRAPHY 330 (Cambridge Unv. Press,
2004).
27. Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More Flexible
Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2008).
28. Candice Delmas, The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing, 41(1) SOC. THEORY &
PRACT. 77, 81 (2015).
29. Ellen C. Brotman & Erin C. Dougherty, Blue Collar Tactics in White Collar Cases, 35 THE
CHAMPION 16, 18 (2011).
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that protect whistleblowers from retaliation30 and some of these laws
have been around for nearly a century.31
The False Claims Act (FCA) was the first federal whistleblower
statute that ctually focused on whistleblower32.  Whistleblowers have
used this law since the Civil War to inform the federal government of
fraud and abuse.33  Originally in the FCA, whistleblowers were la-
beled as relators.34 The FCA states that any person who knowingly
submitted a false claim35 to the government was liable for double the
damage to the government plus a $2,000 penalty for each false claim.
The requirement that the relator have knowledge of the falsity of the
claim was a necessary element under this statute.36  In 1986 when this
statute was amended to change the double damages provision to
treble damages, it increased the penalties to not less than $5,000 and
not more than  $10,000,37 and incentivized whistleblowers to sue on
behalf of the federal government.38  The statute specifically does not
apply to federal tax claims.39  There is no provision for anonymous
whistleblowers under the False Claim Act, so all whistleblowing to the
federal government is confidential, not anonymous.  Additional
amendments were made in 200940 and 2010.41
According the U.S.  Justice Department, monetary recoveries under
the FCA for the 2015 fiscal year exceeded $3.5 billion dollars.42  Prin-
cipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer stated
“[t]he False Claims Act has again proven to be the government’s most
effective civil tool to ferret out fraud and return billions to taxpayer-
funded programs.”43
30. KOHN, supra note 22 (discussing various federal laws related to whistleblowers).
31. Norm D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 40 (2013).
32. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et
seq. (2012)).  This Civil War era statute was created due to a concern that suppliers of goods to
the Union Army committed fraud against the government.
33. Brotman, supra note 29, at 17.
34. See United States ex rel. v. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 226 (1st
Cir. 2004) (defining a relator as someone who relates fraudulent action on behalf of the
government).
35. § 3729(a) (defining the creation of the liability).
36. § 3729(b)(1) (defining knowledge of false information).
37. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.5 Billion From
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015.
39. § 3729(d).
40. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
41. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (ex-
tending the reach of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33).
42. Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.5 Billion, supra note 38.
43. Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.5 Billion, supra note 38.
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One attorney has indicated that under the False Claim Act, whistle-
blowers with their information under seal will eventually need to re-
veal their identity in court, but their identity can remain under seal
and known only to a few within the government agency during the
government investigation stage.44
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) has whistle-
blower protection as its primary objective, thus making it the second
federal law focusing on whistleblowers.45  Congress wanted federal
employees to speak up if they saw something inappropriate in the gov-
ernment workplace and wanted to protect these whistleblowers from
retaliation.  The WPA focuses on federal employees that may become
whistleblowers that report, with a reasonable belief that waste, fraud,
or abuse by an agency has occurred.  The WPA was amended by the
2012 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA).  The
WPA protects federal employees from retaliation in the form of a neg-
ative personnel action because they reported waste, fraud, or abuse.
This statute required the appointment of a Whistleblower Protection
Ombudsman by the Inspectors General.
All federal employees of agencies are not covered by the WPA or
the WPEA.  As just one example, postal workers are not covered.
The WPA as amended by the WPEA provides for confidential report-
ing of waste, fraud, or abuse.  Several court cases narrowed the appli-
cability of the WPA to “job-duty whistleblowers” and the lack of First
Amendment protections to these whistleblowers as well.46  The pro-
tections are there for those who speak out about a matter of public
concern.  Thus the need for additional uniform whistleblower
protections.
B. Early Federal Laws with Secondary Whistleblower Protections
There are many federal laws with a focus on whistleblower protec-
tion within the law.  Some of these laws will be discussed within this
44. Tony Munter, Can You Remain Anonymous While Blowing the Whistle on Fraud?, Price
Benowitz, LLP, https://whistleblower-quitam-attorney.net/whistleblower/the-experience/can-
you-remain-anonymous/ (last visited June 27, 2018).
45. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
46. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guar-
nieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011); Wintraub v. Bd. of Ed., 593 F.3d 196 (2nd Cir. 2010); Ruotolo v. City
of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2nd Cir. 2008); Nichols v. Dancer, 657 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011)
(where the courts have determined that government employees that act within their official du-
ties do not have a First Amendment right of free speech and are not protected from retaliation
when they blow the whistle on their government employers); see also Richard Moberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L.R. 1, 15 (2012).
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section, but not all of them.47  We will also not discuss state laws pro-
tecting whistleblowers.
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 was created by Congress to over-
rule two Executive Orders of two presidents48 which both forbade
federal employees from communicating directly with Congress with-
out the permission of the supervisors.  These executive orders oc-
curred during a period where the employees were unsatisfied with
their working conditions and pay.  The Lloyd-La Follette Act states,
“[n]o person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be
removed or suspended without pay therefrom except for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of such service and for reasons given in
writing.”  In addition, federal employees could provide confidential
information to Congress, individual congressional members, or com-
mittees and not be denied or interfered with.
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) was passed in or-
der to give more transparency to the public and to allow the public
greater access to governmental records.49  A FOIA request can be a
valuable tool for the whistleblower to obtain documents and records
that they might not otherwise obtain from a government agency.  In
addition, a provision in the FOIA provides an exemption from disclo-
sure of any record that would disclose a confidential source used for
purposes of law enforcement.50  This provision could protect the whis-
tleblower that provides information to a governmental entity.  Ex-
emption 7(D) ensures that “confidential sources are not lost through
retaliation against the sources for past disclosure or because of the
sources’ fear of future disclosure.”51
47. See Jon O. Shimabukuro & L. Paige Whitaker, Whistleblower Protections Under Federal
Law: An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. (Sept. 13, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42727.pdf
(discussing nineteen federal laws with whistleblower provisions protecting both the federal
worker and private citizen).
48. Theodore Roosevelt, Exec. Order No. 163 (1902); William H. Taft, Exec. Order No. 1142
(1909).
49. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 522 (2016)).
50. Id. at § 522 (b)(7)(D); See Billington v. D.O.J., 301 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2004) (stat-
ing that “Exemption 7(D) has long been recognized as affording the most comprehensive protec-
tion of all FOIA’s law enforcement exemptions” (citing Voinche v. F.B.I., 940 F. Supp. 323, 331
(D.D.C. 1996)); See also Irons v. F.B.I., 880 F.2d 1446, 1451 (1st Cir. 1989).
51. See generally Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption-7d.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018), (citing relevant precedent, Ortiz v. HHS, 70 F.3d 729, 732 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that “Exemption 7(D) is meant to protect confidential sources from retaliation that may
result from the disclosure of their participation in law enforcement activities”); McDonnell v.
United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that “goal of Exemption 7(D) [is] to
protect the ability of law enforcement agencies to obtain the cooperation of persons having
relevant information and who expect a degree of confidentiality in return for their coopera-
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The Civil Service Reform Act of 197852 is also known as the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and allows for non-pos-
tal government workers to unionize, but includes important whistle-
blower provisions.53  The whistleblower provision in this statute states:
“the authority and power of the Special Counsel should be in-
creased so that the Special Counsel may investigate allegations in-
volving prohibited personnel practices and reprisals against Federal
employees for the lawful disclosure of certain information and may
file complaints against agency officials and employees who engage
in such conduct.”54
This provision gives non-postal federal whistleblowers the right to
appeal to the Merit System Protection Board if they believe they have
suffered retaliation for disclosing information and a complaint in the
court system was not successful.  The Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989 strengthened the whistleblower provisions.
According to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA), if an employee believes that working conditions are unsafe
or unhealthful, a confidential complaint can be filed.55  OSHA will
tion”); Providence Journal Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 563 (1st Cir. 1992)
(explaining that Exemption 7(D) is intended to avert “drying-up” of sources) (citing Irons, 880
F.2d at 1450-51); Nadler v. D.O.J., 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11th Cir. 1992) (observing that “fear of
exposure would chill the public’s willingness to cooperate with the FBI . . . [and] would deter
future cooperation” (citing Cleary v. F.B.I., 811 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1987); Shaw v. F.B.I., 749
F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that purpose of Exemption 7(D) is “to prevent the FOIA
from causing the ‘drying up’ of sources of information in criminal investigations”); Schoenman v.
F.B.I., 763 F. Supp. 2d 173, 200 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that F.B.I. properly invoked Exemp-
tion 7(D) because as it stated in its declaration “public disclosure of [confidential] source infor-
mation would have a chilling effect on the cooperation of other sources and thereby hinder its
ability to gather confidential information”); Sellers v. D.O.J., 684 F. Supp. 2d 149, 161 (D.D.C.
2010) (noting that exemption “not only protects confidential sources, but also protects the ability
of law enforcement agencies to obtain relevant information from such sources”); Miller v.
D.O.J., 562 F. Supp. 2d 82, 122 (D.D.C. 2008) (recognizing that “[e]xperience has shown the
F.B.I. that its sources must be free to provide information ‘without fear of reprisal’ and ‘without
the understandable tendency to hedge or withhold information out of fear that their names or
their cooperation with the FBI will later be made public’” (quoting agency declaration)); Wilson
v. D.E.A., 414 F. Supp. 2d 5, 15 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that release of names of D.E.A.
sources could jeopardize D.E.A. criminal investigative operations and deter cooperation of fu-
ture potential DEA sources); Garcia v. D.O.J., 181 F. Supp. 2d 356, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (hold-
ing that “Exemption 7(D) [en]sures that confidential sources are protected from retaliation in
order to prevent the loss of valuable sources of information”).
52. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)).
53. The Statute, U.S. Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., https://www.flra.gov/about/introduction-flra/
statute (last visited June 19, 2018).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 1101.
55. How to File a Safety and Health Complaint, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AD-
MIN., www.osha.gov/workers/file_complaint.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (the form itself al-
lows the reporting employee to check a box indicating, “Do NOT reveal my name to my
Employer”).
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keep the complaint confidential.56  It is also illegal for an employer to
retaliate against an employee that has filed a complaint with OSHA.
If retaliation has occurred, the employee can file a whistleblower com-
plaint with OSHA.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration recently pub-
lished a final rule reinforcing the current requirement that employers
must have a reasonable procedure for employees to report workplace
safety injuries or illnesses without employees being subject to disci-
pline or discrimination.57  The rule precludes employers from using or
threatening drug testing to retaliate against employees who report in-
juries or illnesses.
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) also has a provision for whistle-
blowers.58  Of course the main purpose of the IRC is the collection of
taxes to fund the government, but there is a secondary goal to finan-
cially reward those who report delinquent or evasive taxpayers.59  The
IRS protects the identity of a tax fraud whistleblower to the fullest
extent that is allowable under the law.60
Finally the Inspectors General Act of 1978 established hotlines to
report waste, fraud, and abuse.61  However, in 1989, the Project on
Military Procurement testified to the General Accounting Office that
they feared hotlines led “unsuspecting sources towards potential pro-
fessional suicide” due to a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of
hotlines and anonymity protections.62
C. Recent Laws with Whistleblower Provisions
The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act, known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act63 (SOX), was passed by Con-
gress as a result of the scandals surrounding Enron, WorldCom, and
56. OSHA Online Complaint Form, Occupational Safety and Health Admin., www.osha.gov/
pls/osha7/eComplaintForm.html (last visited June 4, 2018) (the form itself allows the reporting
employee to check a box indicating, “Do NOT reveal my name to my Employer”).
57. Memorandum from Dorothy Dougherty, Deputy Assistant Secretary OSHA (Oct. 19,
2016), avaiable at www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/finalrule/interp_recordkeeping_101816.html; 29
U.S.C § 660(c).
58. Tax Relief and Health Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2922, 2958-
59 (2006) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C § 7623 (2012)).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006).
60. Confidentiality and Disclosure for Whistleblowers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://
www.irs.gov/compliance/confidentiality-and-disclosure-for-whistleblowers (last visited June 4,
2018).
61. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLE-BLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 106 (2003).
62. Id. at 107-108.
63. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C (2012)).
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other companies, which led to the need to reform Wall Street and fi-
nancial reporting requirements.64  SOX amended the Securities Ex-
change Act to embody important whistleblower provisions.65
“Congress intended that the law would “play a crucial role in restoring
trust in the financial markets” by ensuring that “corporate fraud and
greed” would be “better detected, prevented and prosecuted.”66  SOX
requires publicly held companies in the U.S.  to establish “procedures
for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints received by the
issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing
matters; and the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of
the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters.”67  Thus, SOX provides for “top-down internal control mea-
sures that forced securities issuers and public companies to create and
maintain internal compliance mechanisms.”68
Whistleblowers now have a civil cause of action69 under SOX for
retaliation, as well as it a crime to punish or retaliate against whistle-
blowers.70  SOX is often referred to as the whistleblower provision
because it refers to those who “refuse to engage in and/or report ille-
gal or wrongful activities of their employer or fellow employees,”71
thus providing a definition for the whistleblower.
SOX mandates that a channel for anonymous whistleblowing is
maintained.  The audit committees of companies that are covered
under SOX must establish procedures where employee whistleblowers
can anonymously report issues of concern regarding accounting or au-
diting matters.72  Procedures must be in place to treat and retain these
whistleblower reports.73
64. Labriola, supra note 4 (discussing the recent cases involving internal business corruption
and fraud).
65. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 301.
66. Labriola, supra note 4, at 2848, (citing STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW:
A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES, at xi (2004)).
67. § 301(4)(B).
68. Labriola, supra note 4, at 2849.
69. § 806.
70. § 1107 (creating a broad rule covering all whistleblowing activities, not just those for se-
curity fraud).
71. ROBERT T. BEGG, WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS AND ETHICS, ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 187
(Patricia Salkin, ed A.B.A. 2008).
72. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760-61
(2007).
73. Id. at 1761(citing Jennifer Bjorhus, Hot Lines Hot: Watchdog Law Has Companies Scram-
bling to Line Up Off-site Services to Record Anonymous Employee Comments, ST. PAUL PIO-
NEER PRESS, at D1 (Oct. 12, 2004)).
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The adopting release for Rule 10A-3 (Release No. 33-8220) specifi-
cally provides flexibility for the audit committees to develop “proce-
dures appropriate for their circumstances” and does not mandate
specific procedures or a “one-size-fits-all” approach.  However, nearly
all public companies have chosen to include a whistleblower hotline as
part of their SOX 301 compliance.  SOX also “contains an antiretalia-
tion provision providing a civil cause of action by an employee against
the employer that has retaliated against the employee due to the
whistleblowing.”74
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (Dodd-Frank),75 was considered a game changer for whistle-
blower protections.76  The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) recently made statements regarding the importance of whistle-
blowers in a settled case that involved the reporting of bribes and ac-
counting irregularities related to the bribes.  A “[t]hreat of financial
punishment for whistleblowing is unacceptable.”77  “We will continue
to take a hard look at these types of provisions and fact patterns.”78
Similarly, the SEC has stated that the agency is “committed to pro-
tecting identity to the fullest extent possible.”79  According to re-
search, the single best way to combat fraud is to provide a way for
employees to report anonymously.80
“The whistleblower program was designed to complement, rather
than replace, existing corporate compliance programs.  While it pro-
vides incentives for insiders and others with information about unlaw-
ful conduct to come forward, it also encourages them to work within
their company’s own compliance structure, if appropriate.”81 The SEC
is prohibited from disclosing “any information, including information
74. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C.
L.R. 1, 7 (2012).
75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
76. See KOHN, supra note 22 (exploring federal and state whistleblower laws).
77. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Anheuser-Busch inBev
With Violating FCPA and Whistleblower Protection Laws (Sept. 28, 2016) (available at https://
www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-196.html) (discussing a $6 million settle agreement after an
investigation uncovered inadequate accounting methods which allowed for third-party bribes in
India and an agreement to quiet the whistleblower).
78. Id.
79. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/owb/owb-faq.shtml (last visited May 19, 2018).
80. 2016 ACFE Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud
Study, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.acfe.com/rttn2016/
about/executive-summary.aspx (reporting a study of 2,410 cases of occupational fraud that oc-
curred in 114 countries exceeding $6.3 billion dollars).
81. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 79.
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provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasona-
bly be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower.”82  Whistle-
blower information should remain confidential.83
In addition, under the SEC program rules, whistleblowers who vol-
untarily provide original information that leads to an enforcement ac-
tions with monetary sanctions over one million dollars will enable the
whistleblower to receive an award of 10-30 percent of the money col-
lected by the SEC.84  “Any whistleblower who anonymously makes a
claim for an award . . . shall be represented by counsel if the whistle-
blower anonymously submits the information upon which the claim is
based.  Prior to the payment of an award, a whistleblower shall dis-
close the identity of the whistleblower and provide the information as
the Commission [SEC] may require, directly or through counsel for
the whistleblower.”85  Of course the attorney will know the identity of
the whistleblower, but due to attorney-client confidentiality provi-
sions, there are few circumstances in which the attorney can divulge
the information without client consent.86  “By law, the SEC protects
the confidentiality of whistleblowers and does not disclose informa-
tion that might directly or indirectly reveal a whistleblower’s iden-
tity.”87  As an example, the law firm of Katz, Marshall & Banks
represented an anonymous whistleblower that received an award of
approximately $2.5 million for the whistleblower’s role in stopping the
illegal activity of a mutual fund company.88
In the case of Kansas Gas & Electric v. Brock, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit set precedent to protect whistleblowers
that report internally.89  This case involved an employee who was fired
for filing an internal safety complaint about the results of a nuclear
facility inspection, and subsequently reported it to the Department of
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (2010).
83. Id.
84. Office of the Whistleblower, SEC, www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2).
86. Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Buying Voice: Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing
Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697 (2015) (discussing the various attorney-client confidentiality pro-
visions and appropriate whistleblowing by lawyers); Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary?
When Attorneys Act as Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027 (2015) (discussing SEC
rules under Dodd-Frank requiring attorneys to blow the whistle).
87. Press Release, U.S. Sec. And Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces $2.5 Million Whistleblower
Award, (July 25, 2017) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-130).
88. Katz, Marshall & Banks Client Awarded $2.4 Million by SEC Whistleblower Office for
Role in Stopping Manipulation of Mutual Fund Share Prices, KATZ, MARSHALL & BANKS, LLP,
http://www.kmblegal.com/news/katz-marshall-banks-client-awarded-24-million-sec-whistleblow
er-office-role-stopping (last visited June 9, 2018).
89. Kansas Gas & Electric v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
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Labor.90  The issue became whether the act of internal reporting was
protected under the whistleblower statute.  In another case, the appel-
late court looked at who and what constitutes a whistleblower under
the Dodd-Frank Act.91  This case involved an employee, Asadi, who
witnessed a security law violation while stationed at a plant in Iraq
and later was retaliated against for the internal reporting.92  The court
determined that Asadi was not a whistleblower because he only re-
ported internally, and not to the SEC.  The court ultimately decided
that the language of the statute was ambiguous, and it was not the
court’s place to rewrite the language written by Congress.  Since the
language of Dodd-Frank was unclear regarding whether Asadi was a
whistleblower, the court was not compelled to make the decision.
This case conflicts with the SEC’s interpretation of the statute as well
as several other lower court decisions.  Company employees may now
feel exposed and vulnerable.  In a subsequent case, where the em-
ployee reported the violation both internally and to the SEC, the
court broadened the definition of a whistleblower.  In Kramer v.
Trans-Lux Corp., the court indicated that the narrow statutory inter-
pretation in Asadi went against the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act.93
Most recently the United States Supreme Court has spoken on the
issue of the definition of whistleblower.  In Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v.
Somers, the Court held that Dodd-Frank did not protect an internal
whistleblower from retaliation who did not report the information to
the SEC.94  The Court determined that the definition of a whistle-
blower is one “who provides pertinent information to the Commis-
sion.”95  The whistleblower in the case, Paul Somers, alleged that his
employment was terminated after he reported securities law violations
to senior management of his employer.  Somers believed that this was
retaliation in violation of Dodd-Frank.  The Court disagreed with this
argument and made literal interpretations of three clauses in Dodd-
Frank to determine “what conduct, when an engaged “whistleblower,”
is shielded from employment discrimination.”96 A whistleblower with
90. Id. at 1508.
91. Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
92. Id.
93. Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424 SRU, 2012 WL 4444820 at *1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 25, 2012). See Jim McQuade, Renee Phillips & Mike Delikat, Federal Court Decisions
Permit Two Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Cases to Proceed, EMP. L. & LITIG. BLOG (Oct. 11,
2012), http:// www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-court-decisions-permit-two-dodd-58264.
94. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767 (2018).
95. Id. at 770.
96. Id.
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conduct that falls outside of this described conduct, “is ineligible to
seek redress”97 under Dodd-Frank.
Whistleblowers do not need to use an internal process before re-
porting to the SEC.  In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled
that Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections against retaliation only
applies to whistleblowers that externally report to the SEC.98
In summary, anonymity should always be preserved for as long as
possible.  However, if a whistleblower wishes to claim a reward availa-
ble under the law, his or her anonymity will likely be stripped away in
favor of confidentiality.  Therefore, the compensation needs to be sig-
nificant to outweigh the professional and personal risks to the
whistleblower.
D. Additional Whistleblower Guidelines
The International Ombudsman Association is an organization that
may provide an avenue of confidentiality when setting up an internal
whistleblower plan.  The International Ombudsman Association was
created in 2005 to “advance the profession of organizational
ombudsman and ensure that practitioners are able to work to the
highest professional standards.99  The organization supports internal
ombudsmen groups working within businesses, educational institu-
tions, the government, and nonprofit ventures.100
A provision in the International Ombudsman Association Stan-
dards of Practice concerns the confidentiality of the whistleblower.101
The provision suggests that the Ombudsman should “take all reasona-
ble steps to safeguard confidentiality,”102 including “the identity of
any individual contacting the Ombudsman office.”103
III. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
“Man is least himself when he talks in his own person.  Give him a
mask, and he will tell you the truth.” Oscar Wilde104
97. Id. at 770-71.
98. Id. at 779.
99. About Us, INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASSOC., https://www.ombudsassociation.org/About-Us.aspx
(last visited June 9, 2018).
100. Id.
101. IOA Standards of Practice, INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASSOC., https://www.ombudsassociation




104. OSCAR WILDE, THE CRITIC AS ARTIST (1891).
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In this section, we outline key issues that threaten the effectiveness
of modern whistleblowing.  First, we discuss potential motivations for
the identification of whistleblowers.  Second, we discuss key differ-
ences between anonymity and confidentiality.  Third, we discuss dif-
ferent types of identification, along with various methods interested
parties might employ to identify anonymous whistleblowers.  Lastly,
we address some challenges with respect to obtaining evidence to sup-
port retaliation claims.
A. Motivations for Whistleblower Identification
Before we can take steps to protect a group of individuals, we must
first better understand the threats against them.  Threat modeling is
an approach that attempts to identify the actors and methods em-
ployed by those actors to ensure that proper safeguards are in
place.105  This section will describe some of the possible motivations
for identifying whistleblowers.
In the context of whistleblowing, there are many actors that might
be highly interested in discovering the wrongdoing being reported
and/or identifying the individual(s) making the report.  Each type of
actor is motivated differently.  We have classified these actors into the
following groups: accused, employer, competitors, government agen-
cies, state-sponsored adversaries, media organizations, criminals, and
hacktivists.  Examples of what might motivate actors to attack report-
ing systems include self-preservation, economic benefit, power, and
social justice.  Therefore, we must ensure that these threats have been
considered.
The most common threat against whistleblowers comes in the form
of retaliation levied by the individuals that are accused of wrongdoing
and/or other members of the organization.106  These actors have a
vested interest in suppressing the reporting of the wrongdoing because
they feel that its disclosure will result in negative consequences for
them.  If the individuals responsible for reporting can be identified, it
might be possible to prevent the wrongdoing from being disclosed
publicly.  It is also important to note that employers regularly monitor
employee behavior, which can thwart efforts to expose corruption
prior to a report even being made.  For example, an employer might
be able to detect an individual attempting to gather evidence of a
wrongdoing.
105. ADAM SHOSTACK, THREAT MODELING: DESIGNING FOR SECURITY 3-25, 34-42 (2014).
106. Michael T. Rehg, Retaliation Against Whistle-Blowers: An Integration and Typology, 11 J.
ACAD. BUS. & ECON. 47, 48 (2011).
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However, attempts to compromise the reporting of wrongdoing are
not limited to those within the organization.  While illegal within the
United States, both domestic and foreign competitors have been
known to engage in corporate espionage.107  The mere existence of a
reporting system that potentially contains an organization’s deepest
and darkest secrets presents an attractive target.  For example, if a
competitor is able to gain access to such a system, it would then be
possible for evidence of wrongdoing to be passed along to media orga-
nizations or law enforcement to negatively impact public perception
and/or reduce market value.  On the other hand, government agencies
and other state-sponsored adversaries could potentially be interested
in obtaining such information to gain leverage over certain individuals
in the organization.108
Data breaches are a regular headline today and most cyber thieves
are equal opportunity criminals willing to attack any system of value.
If an organization employs a poorly protected reporting system, one
can expect cyber attacks to eventually compromise it.  Depending
upon the information that is obtained, opportunistic hackers could re-
sell that knowledge on the dark web or exploit it for their own
purposes.109
In free societies, the media is expected to hold individuals, organi-
zations, and the state accountable for its actions, which makes whistle-
blowers attractive sources.110  While proper journalistic practices
would not condone unethical methods of obtaining sources or evi-
dence, this is likely untrue for hacktivists.  While the two might be
similarly motivated, hacktivists commonly feel that the ends justify the
means.111
B. Anonymity Versus Confidentiality
Perhaps the most fundamental issue plaguing existing whistleblow-
ing laws is the lack of specific definitions for confidentiality and ano-
nymity.  As a whistleblower wishing to remain anonymous, this
107. Marjorie Chan, Corporate Espionage and Workplace Trust/Distrust, 42(1) J. BUS. ETHICS
45, 46 (2003); William M. Fitzpatrick, Samuel A. DiLullo, Donald R. Burke, Trade Secret Piracy
and Protection: Corporate Espionage, Corporate Security and the Law, 12 ADVANCES IN COM-
PETITIVENESS RES. 57 (2004).
108. Scott Jasper & James Wirtz, Cyber Security, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF SECUR-
ITY, RISK & INTELLIGENCE 159-164 (2017).
109. Id.
110. JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 10; TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPO-
RATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE 108-10 (2011).
111. Brett Lunceford, Programs or People? Participation and the Ethics of Hacktivism, in
CONTROVERSIES IN DIGITAL ETHICS 82-88 (2016).
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distinction becomes crucial.  If a whistleblower is identified, it can lead
to significant financial losses including the end of a job or worse yet, a
career.112  Despite being central aspects of statutes designed to protect
whistleblowers, the ambiguity surrounding these terms has allowed for
a wide interpretation of what satisfies the legal requirements, espe-
cially with respect to technical aspects of whistleblower reporting sys-
tems.  This section will contrast confidentiality and anonymity.
According to experts “anonymity is one polar value of a broad di-
mension of identifiability versus nonidentifiability”113 along a contin-
uum from “fully anonymous to fully identified”.114  Once a person can
be identified along one or more of the seven dimensions of identity,
maintaining his or her anonymity is no longer possible.115  Similarly,
individuals often assume that confidentiality also provides anonymity.
Confidentiality is employed when a source’s identity can be known to
at least one authorized person, but he or she promises that the
source’s identity will not be shared with any unauthorized parties.116
However, since the source is identified by at least one individual, all
expectations of anonymity must be abandoned.117  Therefore, ano-
nymity can only be achieved if it is impossible for any person to iden-
tify the individual in question.
Consequently, it is impossible to achieve anonymity in non-medi-
ated interactions.118  This might occur when an employee raises a con-
cern to his or her superior as prescribed in an open-door policy.  In
those situations, confidentiality is a whistleblower’s only hope.  Since
at least one person knows the identity of the source, the whistle-
blower’s safety is dependent upon his or her identity not being shared
with someone interested in retaliating against the whistleblower.
C. Identifying Anonymous Whistleblowers
“You know, it’s not everyday that a whistleblower is actually willing
to be identified.” Laura Poitras119
112. Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Buying Voice: Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing
Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (2015).
113. Gary T. Marx, What’s in a Name? Some Reflections on the Sociology of Anonymity, 15
THE INFOR. SOC’Y 99, 100 (1999) (defining the terms anonymity and identifiability).
114. Craig R. Scott, To Reveal or Not to Reveal—A Theoretical Model of Anonymous Com-
munications, 8(4) COMM. THEORY 381, 387 (1998).
115. Marx, supra note 113, at 100.
116. Scott, supra note 114, at 383.
117. Scott, supra note 114, at 383.
118. Scott, supra note 114, at 382.
119. Laura Poitras & Tom Engelhardt, Tomgram: Laura Poitras and Tom Engelhardt, The
Snowden Reboot, TOMDISPATCH (Oct. 19, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/
175909/tomgram%3A_laura_poitras_and_tom_engelhardt,_the_snowden_reboot/.
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There are many potential threats to anonymity and failing to ac-
count for just one might be the difference in a whistleblower remain-
ing anonymous and potentially the subject of unlawful retaliation.  To
truly understand how anonymity can be compromised, one must first
understand the various ways one might be identified.120  Marx pro-
vides an excellent framework for assessing whether a given system
truly delivers anonymity.121  The seven types of identity knowledge he
outlined consist of: “(1) legal name, (2) locatability, (3) pseudonyms
that can be linked to legal name and/or locatability (i.e, a form of
pseudo-anonymity), (4) pseudonyms that cannot be linked to other
forms of identity knowledge, (5) pattern knowledge, (6) social catego-
rization and (7) symbols of eligibility/noneligibility.”122  In this sec-
tion, we first provide a brief discussion of each type of identity
knowledge and then follow with examples to illustrate how a whistle-
blower might be identified, especially in today’s digital world.  Note
that some techniques apply to multiple types of identity knowledge
and thus are only mentioned in the type deemed to be the best fit.
1. Legal Name
If an individual’s legal name can be associated with a given action,
his or her activity cannot be considered anonymous.123  This would
occur if a source volunteers his or her identity, even if it was done
unwittingly.  Once a legal name has been attached, all anonymity is
immediately and irrevocably lost.  For example, let’s look at the fol-
lowing hypothetical involving Wendy the whistleblower, Faythe the
compliance officer, and Chuck the wrongdoer.  If Wendy reports an
instance of fraud committed by Chuck to Faythe, some would consider
Wendy’s anonymity protected by Faythe if she simply never mentions
her name to anyone.  However, since Faythe knows that Wendy was
the source of the report, no anonymity exists between Wendy and
Faythe.  Instead, Wendy has only truly achieved confidentiality with
Faythe, and Wendy’s anonymity between her and Faythe is dependent
upon Faythe keeping Wendy’s identity a secret.  If Wendy instead re-
ported the fraud to Mallory, who happened to be an accomplice in
Chuck’s fraud, Wendy’s identity as the whistleblower would be in
jeopardy because Mallory would have no interest in protecting
Wendy.
120. Marx, supra note 113, at 100-02.
121. Marx, supra note 113, at 100-02.
122. Marx, supra note 113, at 100.
123. Marx, supra note 113, at 100.
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Unfortunately, one of the most famous cases of whistleblower retal-
iation occurred in exactly this manner.  Four National Security
Agency (NSA) executives, Thomas Drake, William Binney, Kirk
Wiebe and Ed Loomis, along with Diane Roark, then a staff member
of the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, attempted to blow the whistle on government surveillance
programs.124  They first raised their concerns directly to senior NSA
officials in 2001, then in 2002, filed a complaint with the Inspector
General’s office of the U.S.  Department of Defense, which was re-
sponsible for protecting whistleblowers.125  Under the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, they expected their identities to be protected
to shield them from retaliation.126
However, in November 2005, after Drake witnessed the surveil-
lance program expand rather than see action taken to curb the waste
and abuses, he felt that it was necessary to leak information to the
press.127  Drake set up a Hushmail128 e-mail account and contacted
Sibohan Gorman at the Baltimore Sun under the pseudonym The
Shadow Knows.129  Drake says that he established three ground rules
for his leaks to Gorman: “neither he nor she would reveal his identity;
he wouldn’t be the sole source for any story; he would not supply her
with classified information.”130  Articles critical of the National Secur-
ity Agency’s surveillance activities were published by The New York
Times in December 2005131 and the Baltimore Sun in May 2006.132
The Baltimore Sun article specifically named the ThinThread pro-
gram, which was the in-house and privacy-focused alternative to the
warrantless wiretap program awarded to private contractors that
Drake and his colleagues felt violated the U.S. Constitution.133
The Bush administration wanted to identify the sources of both sto-
ries,134 believing that they might have been the same individual.135  It
124. MARK HERTSGAARD, BRAVEHEARTS: WHISTLE BLOWING IN THE AGE OF SNOWDEN 97-
107 (2016).
125. Id. at 34.
126. Id. at 105.
127. Id. at 35.
128. HUSHMAIL, https://www.hushmail.com/ (last visited June 25, 2018).
129. Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, THE NEW YORKER (May 23, 2011), https://www.newyork
er.com/magazine/2011/05/23/the-secret-sharer.
130. Id.
131. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-
courts.html.
132. HERTSGAARD, supra note 124, at 36.
133. Siobhan Gorman, NSA Killed System That Sifted Phone Data Legally, THE BALT. SUN
(May 18, 2006), https://archive.commondreams.org/scriptfiles/headlines06/0518-07.htm.
134. HERTSGAARD, supra note 124, at 111.
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is alleged that Henry Shelley, general counsel of the Office of Inspec-
tor General, expressed a desire to tell the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation agents investigating the leak about the NSA whistleblowers,
despite his duty to protect them.136  On July 26, 2007, the homes of
Binney, Wiebe, Loomis and Roark were each raided by the FBI.137
After Drake’s home was raided in November 2007, he found himself
“stripped of his security clearance, indicted, threatened with life in
prison, deprived of his federal pension, blackballed in security circles,
and reduced to working as a clerk at an apple store.”138  This example
illustrates why any process that only achieves confidentiality by prom-
ising to withhold a source’s legal name can never be considered anon-
ymous and would not be suitable for protecting whistleblowers.
2. Locatability
Locatability refers to an individual’s “reachability” in both the
physical sense, as well as digital.139 In addition to one’s physical loca-
tion, locatability could also be in the form of an email address or tele-
phone number, regardless of whether one’s legal name is associated
with it.  Modern technology has made it even easier to locate individu-
als, commonly without their knowledge.  Despite a whistleblower’s
best efforts, he or she might be unable to avoid detection.  Digital
communication devices transmit data that can be used to locate the
user.  A whistleblower’s IP address and telephone number can be
traced to the individual’s identity, and possibly specific location.  To
avoid disclosing an identifiable IP address, the user would have to rely
on multiple proxies, such as a virtual private network (VPN) or the
Tor Anonymity Network.140  Further jeopardizing a whistleblower’s
anonymity is the proliferation of Internet-connected and location-ena-
bled devices.  Modern cell phones, vehicles, and cameras typically
showcase features that can pinpoint an individual’s location, such as
through the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS).  Cellular sig-
nals can be triangulated to locate the user of a given cell phone141
135. Mayer, supra note 129.
136. HERTSGAARD, supra note 124, at 111; Charles Clark, Pentagon Watchdog Officials Now
Under Justice Department Probe, GOV’T EXEC. (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.govexec.com/de
fense/2016/03/pentagon-watchdog-officials-now-under-justice-department-probe/126859/.
137. HERTSGAARD, supra note 124, at 112.
138. HERTSGAARD, supra note 124, at 98.
139. Marx, supra note 113, at 101.
140. Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson & Paul Syverson, Tor: The second-generation Onion
Router (2004), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD
=ADA465464 (last visited June 25, 2018).
141. Malte Spitz, Your Phone Company is Watching (2012), https://www.ted.com/talks/malte_
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while Internet Protocol (IP) addresses can locate a user connected to
the Internet, especially when correlated with other geolocation meth-
ods.142 Even retail stores regularly track consumer movements by
monitoring Bluetooth and Wifi identifiers unique to mobile devices.143
It was the tracing of emails and phone calls between former Central
Intelligence Agency case officer Jeffrey Alexander Sterling and re-
porter James Risen that led to Sterling being charged and convicted of
espionage.144  To illustrate this further, a potential whistleblower
wanted to use email as the method of sending information about an
internal safety issue but feared identification.  The potential whistle-
blower used Reddit145 to inquire about the best way to stay anony-
mous with the post below:
I have a situation where I need to send a whistleblower email.  It
needs to be anonymous. As this is concerning a safety issue and an
ongoing lawsuit theres [sic] a good chance someone may spend a
good deal of time trying to determine the source of the email.  My
plan was to use my paid VPN at a public wifi hotspot along with a
temporary mailbox such as mailinator or 10minutemail (I only need
to send a single message, not receive). Will this be enough?  Do i
[sic] need to worry about my MAC address or host name?  I don’t
have the time or technical know-how to even think about going
down the TOR route.  Any advice is greatly appreciated146
This particular Reddit user wisely took steps to disassociate him or
herself from post.  First, we can see that the user created a unique
account for the sole purpose of asking for help with this issue.  The
username of “76df43” is seemingly random and no other posts are
made outside of this thread.  Second, the user is clearly aware of how
a virtual private network (VPN) can shield the IP address from most
adversaries.  However, the user could potentially be identified if the
VPN provider maintains logs of account activity and the user created
trayed by our own data, ZEIT ONLINE (Mar. 10, 2011), https://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/
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the VPN account using his or her true identity or a traceable payment
method.147
Of course, the rapid adoption of cameras for surveillance purposes
can also jeopardize the whistleblower.  For example, China has in-
vested heavily in surveillance technology which, as was demonstrated
to British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent John Sudworth, is
capable of locating targets using facial recognition and result in their
apprehension in just seven minutes.148  Further, once located, the
prior movements of an individual can be retraced up to a week.149
While the current timeframe is troubling, additional data storage
could essentially allow for location history to be stored indefinitely.
The wide-scale adoption of surveillance technology has made it even
more difficult for whistleblowers to ensure that their whereabouts re-
main unknown to interested parties.  Footage could place an individ-
ual at locations known to be visited by the whistleblower to report the
wrongdoing or the very location where the whistleblower witnessed
the wrongdoing itself.  Given these capabilities, even dropping an un-
signed letter into a public mailbox would not ensure that the sender
remains anonymous, especially from government actors.  Therefore,
to remain anonymous, all threats to identification through locatability
must be accounted for.
3. Linkable Pseudonyms
Some processes and systems that claim to offer anonymity protec-
tions simply replace any references to an individual’s legal name with
an associated pseudonym.150  While this might appear to provide ano-
nymity at first glance, it fails to do so since it does not actually sever
the link between the pseudonym and identity.  One example of this
type of identification would be when responses are solicited from
known individuals and instead of associating the person’s name with
the response, a placeholder value, such as an employee ID number, is
used instead.  Since the number can be traced back to the employee’s
identity, no anonymity is truly provided.  Instead, the user is again
dependent upon confidentiality to protect them from retaliation,
which is not reliable.
147. Charles Arthur, Second LulzSec Hacker ‘Neuron’ Could be Tracked Down via UK VPN,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/sep/26/lulzsec-
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Further, even if a whistleblower feels that reporting wrongdoing
would be safer by mailing a physical document, it would be extremely
difficult to ensure that all fingerprints and DNA have been removed
and that no record of their actions has been collected.  Therefore,
these characteristics could allow a well-funded and highly motivated
actor to potentially identify the individual.  Some reporting systems
allow for the whistleblower to remain engaged in conversation with an
investigator by establishing a unique username or password upon sub-
mission.  Unfortunately, many of these systems also allow the user to
select their own credentials, rather than supplying them with a ran-
domly generated passphrase.  Because most people reuse their
usernames and passwords for multiple accounts, this could result in
the individual being identified by an adversary that has access to such
information.
4. Unlinkable Pseudonyms
Unique pseudonyms that have never been linked to a name or loca-
tion provide the highest degree of anonymity when it is desirable for
multiple actions to be associated with the same pseudonym.151  This is
especially useful in the context of whistleblowing since investigators
would prefer to maintain contact with the source.  To maintain con-
tact, the whistleblower must be able to provide the investigator with
some way to associate each contact with the single source.  Some sys-
tems allow whistleblowers to create their own secret credential that
they will use whenever interacting with the system.  However, if the
user naively selects something that can be linked to his or her identity,
any anonymity the system claimed to provide would be compromised.
Instead, it would be best for the system to randomly generate a cre-
dential for the whistleblower to ensure that users do not accidentally
jeopardize their own anonymity.
5. Pattern Knowledge
Further, it is important to note that simply using a random pseudo-
nym does not prevent other actions from betraying the whistle-
blower’s identity.  Individuals can also be identified due to
recognizable patterns in their behavior, regardless of whether their
identity is known.152  For example, researchers have shown that even
if credit card or social media data is stripped of all personally identify-
ing information, individuals can still be identified by correlating seem-
151. Marx, supra note 113, at 101.
152. Chris Y.T. Ma, David K.Y. Yau & Nung Kwan Yip, Privacy Vulnerability of Published
Anonymous Mobility Traces, 21 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 721 (2013).
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ingly disparate datasets.153 As Marx also points out, one might
recognize and be able to identify an individual who rides the same
subway to work each day, even without knowing his or her legal
name.154  The very details shared in a report could also compromise
the source by placing someone at a specific time and place.  If a com-
plete list of individuals known to be present at that time can be ob-
tained, all potential witnesses can be combed for additional clues that
might point to the source’s identity.
A whistleblower can also be identified by technical characteristics.
One major challenge in protecting whistleblowers from these types of
vulnerabilities is that organizations are rightfully motivated in deter-
ring legitimate insider threats.155  However, the same measures used
to detect malicious activity can jeopardize the anonymity of pro-social
whistleblowers.156If a whistleblower’s digital activity appears similar
to malicious insider behavior, it could result in the whistleblower be-
ing accused of wrongdoing before they can even blow the whistle.
For example, system logs and digital fingerprints embedded in doc-
uments can provide a clear timeline of who accessed a file relevant to
the alleged wrongdoing.  Wikileaks published documents exposing ef-
forts by the Central Intelligence Agency to identify whistleblowers
through digital watermarking with a tool codenamed Scribbles.157
These techniques are not limited to government agencies.  Any indi-
vidual can employ similar methods using a free online tool called Ca-
narytokens, which was primarily developed to identify data breaches
by “phoning home” to the token creator any time a particular re-
source is accessed.158  Canarytokens can be generated for particular
websites, hostnames, email addresses, images, Microsoft Word or PDF
153. Yves-Alexandre De Montjoye, Laura Radaelli & Vivek Kumar Singh, Unique in the
Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata, in SCI. MAG 347, 536 (2015);
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documents.159  A Canarytoken can even be planted within file folders
to receive alerts when users access it.160  Thus, investigators with ill-
intent could send files or links with embedded Canarytokens to anon-
ymous whistleblowers.  If a whistleblower does not know how to block
such techniques from being able to transmit back to the token creator,
his or her identity would be immediately exposed as soon as the re-
source is opened, all without the whistleblower’s knowledge.
Even if a whistleblower printed documents to use as evidence, the
exact printer used can be identified by examining unique microscopic
tracking dots that are added to each document as an invisible water-
mark.161  This type of document fingerprinting was originally intended
to prevent forgery, but it was reportedly used as a key piece of evi-
dence in building a case against Reality Leigh Winner.162  Ms.  Win-
ner, a former Air Force linguist, accepted a job as a contractor for the
National Security Agency.163  While assigned to an eavesdropping fa-
cility in Georgia, Ms.  Winner printed out a top-secret intelligence re-
port and physically removed it from the facility with the intent of
mailing it to a reporter at The Intercept.164  The government was noti-
fied of the impending publication on May 30, 2017.165  Ms.  Winner
was not aware that printing the document could be traced to her
through system logs and document watermarking.  These clues re-
sulted in Ms.  Winner being identified and arrested prior to the story
being published on June 5, 2017, less than a week after the govern-
ment was notified of the forthcoming story.166
Simply browsing to the webpage for reporting wrongdoing can also
reveal several key pieces of information that could be used to identify
159. Canarytokens Introduction, THINKST, http://blog.thinkst.com/p/canarytokensorg-quick-
free-detection.html (last visited June 13, 2018).
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the individual.167  Most websites today gather and analyze information
about its users, such as IP address, web browser, screen resolution,
and operating system.168  These characteristics are typically used in
improving website usability, but they can just as easily be used to iden-
tify the individual.  Many websites also track behavior across multiple
websites with browser cookies.169  For example, if a whistleblower
happened to be logged into one website while simultaneously report-
ing wrongdoing on another, it is possible for a browser cookie to tie
the actions on both websites to the same user.  Accepting default set-
tings on standard Internet browsers can also leak identifiable data
about the user and his or her actions, such as location, browsing his-
tory, information that is copied from the website, and the status of the
device’s webcam, microphone, and battery.170
6. Social Categorization
A whistleblower could also be identified through social categoriza-
tion, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, age, health status, or leisure
activities.171  For example, a whistleblower’s voice could be analyzed if
they call a telephone hotline.172 A person’s handwriting, or even writ-
ing style, especially with the advancement of text analytics, can also be
reliably compared to writing attributable to known individuals.173 For
example, the use of proper grammar could reveal the individual’s
likely education level.  Many reporting systems in use today also seek
a tremendous amount of contextual information regarding the wrong-
doing in question.  Unfortunately, by prompting the user to submit
this information, a naı̈ve whistleblower is likely to comply, which
could potentially jeopardize his or her anonymity.  For example, ask-
ing a whistleblower to provide information regarding the time, loca-
tion, or individuals involved could allow for those interested in
167. COMPLETE GUIDE TO INTERNET PRIVACY, ANONYMITY & SECURITY 15-21 (2d ed. Nerel
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retaliation to quickly pinpoint the whistleblower.  These types of con-
text clues can vary depending upon the type of wrongdoing being al-
leged, but every piece of information shared only further reduces the
pool of possible whistleblowers.174
7. Symbols of Eligibility/Noneligbility
Symbols of eligibility/noneligibility are used for all kinds of activi-
ties in modern society.175 Employee badges, event tickets and toll
passes can identify whether an individual has been granted access.
However, these symbols are not limited to physical objects.  For exam-
ple, reporting systems can allow for two-way communication with
whistleblowers.  When a whistleblower wishes to further discuss a
prior report, he or she can access the system using a secret passphrase
associated with the report for authentication purposes.  However, it is
important to point out that the security of these symbols is critical to
their reliability.  If a symbol is compromised, the user will be misiden-
tified.  Further, unique lingo or jargon specific to an industry or job
role could reveal clues regarding past or present work experience,
which might increase credibility, yet also reveal too much about the
whistleblower’s background.  Although not tied to one’s legal name
directly, this type of information could be correlated to identify the
likely source.
D. Lack of Retaliation Case Law Regarding
Anonymous Whistleblowers
Despite these capabilities, there is little case law that adequately
describes the use of these techniques to identify anonymous whistle-
blowers.  We believe that this is likely for a few reasons.  First, the
Ethics Resource Center reports that 92% of whistleblowers reported
their concerns to someone internal to the organization, with 82% re-
porting to their supervisor at some point in the process.176  Therefore,
the capabilities outlined in this paper are largely unnecessary to iden-
tify most whistleblowers because they were likely never anonymous in
the first place.
Second, due to continuous log generation and limited storage ca-
pacity, system logs might not be stored long enough for whistleblow-
ers to obtain during discovery.  While some laws (e.g., Stored
174. STEPHEN M. KOHN, THE NEW WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE
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30 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
Communications Act177 and Sarbanes-Oxley178) and industry stan-
dards (e.g., Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-
DSS)179) mandate a minimum data retention period for certain data,
the retention policies can vary significantly among organizations.  If
the time between whistleblower identification and the filing of a com-
plaint is greater than the organization’s data retention period for the
logs sought in discovery, it is unlikely that meaningful evidence will be
obtainable.  For example, unless other evidence can be uncovered that
proves a premeditated and coordinated effort was made to identify
the whistleblower, an organization could theoretically identify an
anonymous whistleblower and allow the logs to be overwritten by the
time a whistleblower ever files a lawsuit for retaliation.  Unfortu-
nately, the inability to prove that the whistleblower could have been
identified by the organization forces retaliation complaints to be
based upon witness testimony and a loose sequence of events without
hard proof that the organization targeted the plaintiff in response to
efforts to blow the whistle.  Therefore, attorneys are unlikely to make
timely requests for discovery to uncover the necessary evidence to
build such a case.
Third, most whistleblowers are unlikely to be adequately prepared
to navigate the technical and legal minefield without accidentally af-
fording the organization a reasonable defense against retaliation.  If
the organization successfully avoids generating proof of deliberate re-
taliation and can instead justify its actions based upon sound legal rea-
soning, the whistleblower is left with little recourse.  Therefore, we
argue against the advocacy of all types of identified reporting in order
to preserve the anonymity protections that whistleblowers deserve.  If
employees and legislators remain ignorant of these pitfalls, retaliation
against whistleblowers will likely continue unabated.
IV. LET’S IMPROVE EXISTING LAWS BY CREATING
A NEW, STRONGER LAW
“In many cases, the best protection against retaliation is to report
possible securities violations anonymously.” Labaton Sucharow,
L.L.P.
Current whistleblower laws in the U.S. do not adequately protect
whistleblowers.  “U.S.  whistleblower policy remains fractured: a
177. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C § 2703(a) (2018).
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patchwork of statutes and case law has led to inconsistent outcomes
and incentives, even as the power of whistleblowing in protecting pub-
lic interest by revealing malfeasance has become clear.”180  It is
viewed that the piecemeal approach to the protection of whistleblow-
ers has led to confusion and lack of protection for whistleblowers.181
We propose a single new federal law in order to strengthen whistle-
blower protections.  This law would not be industry specific and would
apply to all sectors, including nonprofits, for-profits, and the govern-
ment.  In this section, we provide recommendations that must be con-
sidered during the construction of future federal whistleblower
legislation.
A. Definitions of Anonymity vs. Confidentiality
To illustrate a critical shortcoming of existing federal whistleblower
laws, Table 1 illustrates major federal whistleblower legislation and
the lack of definitions for both anonymity and confidentiality.  We be-
lieve that a new comprehensive federal law should include definitions
of both anonymity and confidentiality so that both potential whistle-
blowers and employers understand the difference between the two
terms.
TABLE 1 – ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN CURRENT
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS
Law Adequately Defines Promises Whistleblowers
Anonymity Confidentiality Anonymity Confidentiality
FCA No No No No
WPA No No No Yes
WPEA No No No Yes
LLA No No No No
FOIA No No No No
CSRA No No No Yes
OSHA No No No Yes
SOX No No Yes Yes
Dodd-Frank No No Yes Yes
Laws must ensure that clear definitions are provided for all critical
terms.  Any ambiguity can result in unintended consequences.  There-
180. Bishara, supra note 31, at 43.
181. Bishara, supra note 31, at 65.
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fore, the law, as well as business policies and procedures, should
clearly define both terms.  The suggested definition for confidentiality
is as follows:
Confidentiality: the identity of the whistleblower will be known by
at least one individual as a result of reporting wrongdoing.
However, even if confidentiality is promised to the whistleblower,
the identity of the whistleblower can become known to the govern-
ment, their attorney, a person at work or a third-party reporting com-
pany.  Given the sensitive nature of whistleblowing and the likelihood
of retaliation, we contend that confidentiality is not enough to ade-
quately protect whistleblowers.
We argue that because confidentiality is not sufficient, the law
should mandate anonymity.  The definition of anonymity must focus
on whether the individual can be identified in any way, rather than
simply focus on whether he or she provided a name at the time of
reporting.  As previously discussed, whistleblower anonymity can be
compromised in several different ways, leaving them vulnerable to re-
taliation.  Consequently, we argue that true anonymity can only be
achieved if absolutely no one can identify the source of the report of
wrongdoing.  The sender anonymity set is “a subset of all subjects
worldwide who may send messages.”182  Therefore, the suggested defi-
nition for whistleblower anonymity is as follows:
Anonymity: the state of being not identifiable within a set of poten-
tial whistleblowers, known as the anonymity set.183
A whistleblower is only anonymous if he or she cannot be identified
in any way as a result of blowing the whistle, including actions taken
to acquire evidence of wrongdoing, report concerns internally or ex-
ternally, as well as any subsequent investigations or legal proceedings.
If anonymous reporting cannot be provided, organizations must make
it clear that anonymity protections are not available and that any in-
formation shared, including one’s identity, can only be kept confiden-
tial, which offers less protection than anonymity.
B. Corporate Policies and Procedures
The proposed law should mandate organizational policies and pro-
cedures.  These mandated policies and procedures should ensure that
all potential whistleblowers are properly notified of their options, are
182. Andreas Pfitzmann & Marit Köhntopp, Anonymity, Unobservability, and Pseudonymity
— A Proposal for Terminology, in DESIGNING PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 2 (H.
Federrath Ed. 2001).
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assured that the choice to continue or withdraw a report will be
respected and that any action taken by the whistleblower will not lead
to retaliation.  These policies and procedures should provide a mecha-
nism for whistleblowers to report any retaliation.  Notice of the re-
quirement of anonymity should also be part of the notification to all
employees whom someday may be a whistleblower.
1. Awareness/Notice
It is critical that whistleblowers clearly understand and accept all
risks prior to making their report.  Regardless of the capabilities of the
reporting system, all potential whistleblowers should be provided with
definitions of anonymity and confidentiality to reduce the ambiguity
surrounding each term.  Organizational policies and procedures would
be a good starting point for this notice to be located.  In addition to
being informed of the safest methods to report wrongdoing, potential
whistleblowers must also be provided clear explanations of how their
identity will be protected.
Instructions should include statements that discourage the sharing
of any information that could be used to identify the whistleblower.
Similarly, whistleblowers must not be prompted for any specific infor-
mation.  The inclusion of multiple form fields might result in a whistle-
blower offering too much information without adequately knowing
how it might jeopardize anonymity.  Instead, a single, open response
form should be provided to allow the whistleblower to craft their re-
port however they see fit.  Subsequent communication can allow for
investigators to obtain additional information, if necessary.
Further, information on how to raise concerns should be distributed
in such a way that it protects those who might report by increasing the
size of the anonymity set.  For example, rather than only providing
reporting instructions and a link to the reporting system on a single
page of the company website, the instructions can be embedded on
each page.  This, in effect, makes all visitors to any page of the website
potential whistleblowers.  For the same reason, all employees should
receive physical copies of the whistleblowing policy and procedure.
Additionally, regular training on how to report wrongdoing without
compromising their safety should be provided.  Due to conflict of in-
terest, we recommend that this training be provided by outside infor-
mation security experts rather than by the employer.  All of these
actions increase the number of people who have seen the instructions,
which expands the anonymity set.
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2. Choice/Consent
Whistleblowers must be trusted to choose the most appropriate out-
let to raise their concern.  Laws intended to protect whistleblowers
should not restrict whistleblowers from reporting wrongdoing to
whomever they deem will provide the best protection.  While organi-
zations would certainly prefer that all whistleblowers raise their con-
cerns internally, this desire is counter to the true goal of correcting
wrongdoing.  Rather than view external whistleblowers as disloyal
members and threats to the organization, potential whistleblowers
should be provided reassurance that their safety is paramount and
that external outlets are acceptable if a whistleblower perceives inter-
nal conditions threaten his or her safety.  We propose a single federal
agency to which whistleblowers would report wrongdoings and
retaliation.
Whistleblowers must always have the option of discontinuing their
report.  Should a whistleblower’s anonymity be compromised in any
way in the course of reporting or investigating alleged wrongdoing,
the whistleblower must be informed immediately and given the option
of withdrawing their report.  Failing to properly inform whistleblowers
or forcing them to accept what they deem to be undesirable risks
would be unethical and negatively impact the perception of the re-
porting channel for future whistleblowers.
3. Access/Participation
The proposed federal law should ensure that it is mandatory that
whistleblowers be allowed reasonable access to the status of any in-
vestigation into the alleged wrongdoing.  The manner in which access
is provided must not compromise the whistleblower’s anonymity.  This
can be achieved by providing whistleblowers with a randomly gener-
ated passphrase at the time of the initial report.  The passphrase will
allow the whistleblower to access the reporting system and maintain
communication with investigators throughout the process.
C. Technical Requirements
Most of the online reporting channels still in use today were origi-
nally developed over 15 years ago in response to the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  These channels solicit reports via telephone hot-
lines or standard online forms.  Unfortunately, due to poor design and
implementation, most channels available today fail to provide any
level of reliable anonymity protection without the whistleblower
proactively taking steps to protect their own identity.  As more infor-
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mation is known, the easier it is to narrow down the likely source of a
report of wrongdoing.  Consequently, a naı̈ve whistleblower could still
unintentionally reveal his or her identity simply out of ignorance.
Therefore, the proposed law must require that organizations only so-
licit anonymous reports in a way that minimizes the collection of any
information that could be used to identify the whistleblower.  Three
key improvements to the law can be made with respect to the techni-
cal requirements of reporting systems.
First, laws should state the requirement that the “best available
technology and reporting methods” should be used by both govern-
ment and business organizations to ensure the anonymity of all whis-
tleblowers.  Although whistleblowing has received considerable
attention in the media and academic literature over the past 30
years,184 there has been limited research focused on an overlooked
element of modern whistleblowing; that is, the reporting system itself.
This leaves those who attempt to seek protection under the law worse
off as the mere existence of well-intended statutes might lead some to
gain a false sense of security in believing that their actions are anony-
mous.  Despite its use in practice and a recognized need for such sys-
tems in information systems research,185 little attention has been given
to the technical requirements necessary to maintain anonymity in the
context of whistleblowing, nor has practice benefited from a proposed
design of an effective whistleblowing system.  While constructing leg-
islation involving technology is extremely difficult, especially when
such systems suffer from inadequate development, it is imperative
that laws intended to protect those who reveal wrongdoing must be
future-proof by requiring indicate that the best available technology
should be used in order to protect the identities of whistleblowers.
We also suggest that information systems researchers concentrate on
184. See JANET P. NEAR & MARCIA P. MICELI, STANDING UP OR STANDING BY: WHAT
PREDICTS BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON ORGANIZATIONAL WRONGDOING?, RES. IN PERSONNEL &
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 95 (Joseph J. Martocchio ed., 2005); Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus &
Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of
Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation, 62(3) J. BUS. ETHICS 277 (2005); Rafik Elias,
Auditing Students’ Professional Commitment and Anticipatory Socialization and Their Relation-
ship to Whistleblowing, 23 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 283 (2008); A. J. BROWN, DAVID LEWIS,
RICHARD E. MOBERLY & WIM VANDEKERCKHOVE, INT’L HANDBOOK ON WHISTLEBLOWING
RESEARCH (2014); Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J.
MGMT. 507 (1996).
185. See Paul B. Lowry et al., The Drivers in the Use of Online Whistle-Blowing Reporting
Systems, 30 J. MGMT. INFORM. SYS. 154 (2013); ChongWoo Park et al., Overcoming the Mum
Effect in IT Project Reporting: Impacts of Fault Responsibility and Time Urgency, 9 J. ASSOC.
INFORM. SYS. 409 (2008); ChongWoo Park & Mark Keil, Organizational Silence and Whistle-
Blowing on IT Projects: An Integrated Model, 40 DECISION SCI. 901 (2009).
36 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
the design of reporting systems with a focus on maintaining whistle-
blower anonymity.
Second, legislation should require that organizations only employ
open-source systems.  The ability for interested parties to audit the
source code of any system provides the user with reassurances that the
system behaves as described.  Proprietary, or closed-source, systems
do not allow outside parties to inspect the true behavior of the system,
which could allow organizations to include methods to identify whis-
tleblowers rather measures to protect them.
Third, in addition to open review of source code, any reporting sys-
tem being used by an organization must also be required to undergo
regular, independent audits that focus on assessing both security and
anonymity protections.  A 2006 review of internal reporting proce-
dures advocated for the testing of whistleblowing, policies, procedures
and systems, yet failed to consider whether the whistleblower’s ano-
nymity was properly protected.186  These audits should also extend to
the organization’s policies and procedures regarding whistleblowing.
Doing so will ensure that the anonymity of whistleblowers is protected
by confirming that the process adequately protects whistleblowers
from current threats.  Including these last two measures will future-
proof the law with respect to advances in technology.
D. Corporate Motivation to Comply with the Law
Questions could be raised as to whether firms are truly interested in
protecting whistleblowers.  Given the prevalence of retaliation, it is
possible that some organizations are successfully exploiting weak-
nesses in the law by meeting the minimum standard for compliance
while intentionally employing inadequate systems to identify whistle-
blowers.  To combat this issue, legislation must ensure that the re-
quirements for compliance are clearly stated, but in such a way that
protections can evolve with technological advances.
If whistleblower laws were to clearly define the differences between
anonymous and confidential reporting, any organization that fails to
provide a truly anonymous reporting channel would expose itself to
increased liability.  Employees could take advantage of the organiza-
tion’s poor internal whistleblowing system by submitting an allegation
of wrongdoing that they know will identify them to hold the organiza-
tion hostage.  If the organization later attempted to terminate the em-
ployee or some other adverse employment action, the employee could
186. Steven E. Kaplan & Joseph J. Schultz, The Role of Internal Audit in Sensitive Communi-
cations, J. MGMT. STUD. 10, 25 (2006).
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point to the organization’s ability to identify his or her complaint and
claim that the subsequent termination is a form of retaliation.  There-
fore, the assurance of anonymity not only protects the whistleblower,
but also protects the organization.
Further, media organizations such as Wikileaks are aggressively de-
veloping their own anonymous reporting channels for the purposes of
soliciting tips from the public.  For example, the Freedom of the Press
Foundation manages the development of SecureDrop187, an open-
source whistleblower submission system.  Such systems provide signif-
icantly better anonymity protections when compared to what most
firms are currently using, which only encourages whistleblowers to
disclose their concerns to external outlets.  If organizations fail to im-
plement systems with adequate protections, they run the risk of dam-
aging information being aired out publicly.
E. Punitive Damages
Existing laws require organizations to defend their statutorily man-
dated compliance programs.  However, whistleblowers rarely obtain
favorable decisions unless a clear fact pattern, backed by direct evi-
dence, proves intentional retaliation.  Therefore, we suggest that puni-
tive damages be introduced into new laws that allows for a plaintiff to
receive funds if an organization implements policies, procedures or
systems that can be shown to likely jeopardize whistleblower’s ano-
nymity and are reported by the plaintiff.  The new federal law should
name a government entity such as the SEC or Department of Labor
as the administrative agency in charge of compliance.  Potential plain-
tiffs could first bring the organizational whistleblower deficiencies to
this agency, and if found not in compliance, then the punitive damages
provision would be applicable as punishment to the organization and
a reward for the “whistleblower” of the deficiencies.  Of course, the
deficiencies would need to be remedied.
An organization’s failure to maintain adequate internal controls
might violate the bookkeeping and accounting provisions of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices, Dodd-Frank, and Sarbanes-OxleyActs.188
While some whistleblowers can blow the whistle on the lack of inter-
nal controls under these laws, we argue that comprehensive legislation
should encourage and protect this behavior for all whistleblowers.
187. SECUREDROP, https://securedrop.org/ (last visited June 25, 2018).
188. KOHN, supra note 22, at 217.
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F. Whistleblower Protection Agency
Due to the complex patchwork of existing laws providing varying
degrees of whistleblower protections, we advocate for the creation of
a single, independent agency that would be solely responsible for
overseeing compliance with whistleblowing issues for all organiza-
tions.  All of the agencies and offices currently responsible for receiv-
ing or investigating reports of wrongdoing would be managed by the
newly formed agency.  Doing so would ensure that those facilitating
the whistleblowing process are adhering to best practices and provide
potential whistleblowers with a simplified structure to assist in navi-
gating the legal minefield.
V. CONCLUSION
While federal and state whistleblower laws exist, they fall short in
protecting the whistleblower.  This leaves those who attempt to seek
protection under the law worse off as the mere existence of well-in-
tended statutes often lead to a false sense of security in believing that
their actions are anonymous.  New federal legislation should address
these shortcomings by including clear definitions of confidentiality
and anonymity, requiring the use of the best available technological
protections to facilitate anonymous reporting, increasing financial lia-
bilities for noncompliance by businesses, promoting better corporate
policies, and enhancing the availability of punitive damages for whis-
tleblowers suing businesses for both retaliation and for noncompli-
ance with the law for not having anonymous reporting methods
available to their employees.  It is imperative that laws intended to
protect those who reveal wrongdoing be future proof and truly pro-
vide meaningful legal protections.
